Space station pressurized laboratory safety guidelines by Mcgonigal, Les
SPACE STATION ',
PRESSURIZED LABORATORY
SAFETY GUIDELINES
¢
LES McGONIGAL
NASA/MSFC
WPO1 SAFETY
I,
t
i
SPACE STATION
TOXIC AND REACTIVE MATERIALS
HANDLING WORKSHOP
NOVEMBER 30, 1988
22-1
1991006617-364
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19910006624 2020-03-19T19:12:59+00:00Z
!i t
SPACE SI _.TICN PRESSURIZED LABORATORY SAFE:I'Y GUIDELINES _;
!
._" ,[
The development of space based laboratory guidelines is a mixture of consideration
of past experience, contemplation of present operations and conjectu,'e regarding
proposed endeavors. This is not to _ay that we must grope for ._nswers but that we must
understand the limi_.s of our experience and factor those limits in as we step forward
cautiously. Underlying the development of laboratory safety guidelines for Space Station
Freedom mu_t be the recognition of :he uniqueness of this resource. While safety
requirements for ground-based laboratories have come about literally by accide._t (and
the loss o', many laboratories and a few researchers as well), we can ill afford to generate
satety r,..quirements for space laboratories in the same manner.
It
P_fore we begin to est._blish technical safety guide:ines and requirements a common ,,
understanding of their origin and importance must be shared between Space Station
Program Manage_,ent, the User Community, and the safety organizations involved. This
is done thro'-;gh organiT_et.ion,_nd communication, of course, but there must also be an
appreciation of each others' interests. A sp,?.r.e-basedlaboratory in which the experiments
are received and returned ir) unopened containers, while useful and safe, does not take
full advar'tage of the facilities' potential for more interesting experiments. Safety can be
built into the facility to allow more interes,*ing e,'tperim¢_ =.bu'. _t a cost to the prvgr._m
manager. Safety guideli,._es and requirements will be dri,,¢n by the nature of the
experiments and degree of crew interaction. The greater and more _omplex the potential i
risk the. more stringent and complex the safety requirements. Once a programmatic .
deci:'ion has been made regarding the level of acceptable potential risk, safer)' guidelines
are _hen applied to generate safety requ,, "nents to prevent the potential risk from I
becoming a reality.
IDENTIFY IHE HAZARDS
The first guideline to be applied is that of hazard identification. Grou,,d-based
laboratory and previous flight experience are combined to yield generic requirements
such as those 'or safety showers and containerization of experiments. For as muchb -
experience as we have, however, there are still significant gaps left when it is applied to
the Space Station 13boratory. SKYLAB, SPACELAB, and shuttle mid-deck experiments
allowed limited crew interaction or manipulation and a high degree of training specific to
each experiment was given to assigned ctewmembers. The new and different work
proposed for the Space Station laboratory, i.e. material transfer and characterization,
increases the probability of material spills to the point that serious consideration must be
given to hazardous material spill response capsbility. We have no significant experience
w:,h micro gravity spill propagation, control or cleanup of toxic and reactive materials. J
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The primary tools for identifyinghazardsare the varioushazard analysesthat can I_
appiied to experiment proposals. SSP 30309, "Safety Analysis and Safety Risk
AssessmentRequirementsand ProcessesEecument for the Sp,.ce Station Program", :_
provides the detailed instruction relative to the application of specific:hazard analysis
, techniques.Safety Engineers are generally well-versed in _he t::chniquesof hazard '
anatysi_ hut theymay ur may not havea backgroundin thearea that a given_xperiment
is designed to inves:igare.It will be necessaryto have experimenters involvedin the
_azard analysisprocessin order to more accuratelycharacterizethe associatedhazards
ar,d controls.As hazardsare identified, methodsof controlling them are developedand
cequireme,ts are established.to implement the controls. The hazard elirr,:,;ationand
control precedencesequenceis found in SS:' 30000, Section 9. in the Je_ign of th+,.,
laboratory, eliminating the hazard source or hazardous operation is the foremos,
__ consideration.For laboratory usage, in;roductionof many experimentsalso introducesa
- hazard sourceor hazardous operation.To perform meaningful experimentsa certain
amountof risk has to be accepted,however,the le,'.=!of risk acceptanceneeds to be
establishedby informedmanagementto screenout thoseexperimentsthat pose {cogreat
,,: a threat to the Space Station. This level r,.-.d not be fixed but may change as the
+ capabilitiesof the laboratory and of space-basedlaboratory e::periencemature. Other
actions for control of hazards incorporate safety devices, special procedures and
personnelprater,re clothingor equipment.
7 ,. ;LOP TECHNICAL SAFETY REQUIREMENT__
Technical _afety requirements fall into two categories; those imposed upon the
Program Manager and those imposedupon the User. These are found in SSP 30000,.
section3; SS-SPEC-0002; SS-I_D-0200 and other Space Stationdocuments.
!
IMPOSED ON SPACE STATION o
SSP 30000, SECTION 3 i
:' Emerger:.¢ydecontaminationcf crew members in the event a crew member becomes
contaminateo b_,:. toxic substance used within the _ab. (2.1.2 2.1.I.F)
Containment, tr_n_t'_rand management of both general and toxic trash, materials,
and v,aste used w,thin this laboratory to support payloads. (2.1.2.2.1.2.B)
Stowage of ... emergency equipment. (2.1.2.2.1. I.H/
t
+ Accommodation of safe general storage for payloads in "_telabc'atory. (2.1.2.2.1.1 .G)
Capability shall be provided for detecting and extinguishing any fire ;n Space S_ation
habitable volumes. (2.1.11.2.12)
Co,-,,aminant Sampling (2.1.11.2.16)
Safety !nterlocks, hardware and/or software implemented, shal] be pro,'ided wherever
practical to preventunsafeoperationsfrom beir.ge_ecu_ed.(2.1.=1.2.1.D)"
t
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A cautionand warning systemshall providewarning to the Space Stationon-board
crew m_dgroundpersonnel(as required)of impendingor existingdablgerousconditions
that posea threat _ostationpersonneland/or safetycritical equipment. (2.1.1!.2.2.3) °
Potentiallyexplosive containersshall be located outside habitable areas, shall be
isolatedand protectedso that the failure of one will not causethe failure of the others,
and she!!be designedto leak before rupture. (2.1.11.2.4.1)"
Triple comainmentof hazardousmaterials.The useof chemicalswhichwouldcreatea
toxicityproblem or causea hazard to SSPhardwareif releasedshall be avoider, where
practical. If useof suchchemicalscannot be avoided,theyshall be triple contained.
(2.1.il 2.4.5)"
Hazardous accumulation of fluids. Provisions shall be made to prevent uncontrolled
hazardous accumulations of gases or liquids within me space s;ation. Detection.
monitoring, and control of hazardous gases or vapors shal) be required in critical areas
and closed compartments. (2.1.11.2.5) °
Exposed surface temperatures. Exposed surfaces within pressurized elements shall not
exceed a high temperature of 45 degrees Cent!grade or be protected from crew interaction
with the surface, and a low temperature less than 4 degrees Centigrade. _2.1.11.2.8) °
Hazardou,_ materials. The space station materials requirements for hazardous
materials, flammabili,y, and off gassing are specified in SSP 30233. (2.1.11.3) °
SS-SPEC-0002 CFI SPECIFICATION FOR LABORATORY MC",ULE
Atmosphere Revitalization. The atmospneric revitalization (AR) subsystem will
regenerate the module atmosphere, as necessary, to provide a safe and habitable
environment for ti'e crew. The basic elements of the AR subsystemwill include...
atmosphereconta,_,.inationcontroland monitoring.The atmosphericcontaminantsinclude
tracegases,odors,microbial Iood,particulate anddebrisloadsof the modul_atmosphere.
(3.7.9.3.1)
The Process Material Management Subsystem (PMMS) shall provide.., compatible
waste disposal .... transporting proce:_ inputs or outputs while maintaining isolation from
t_e ge,t:ral USL atmos,_here, ...decontamination equipment .... safe storage of chemicals
and materials (includes user provided materials and fluios), ...support (for) routine '-
, laboratory cleanup.... decontamination equipment. (3.7.16)
The PMMS shall provide decontamination service_ for the crew, laborator_ equipment, ,
and paylcad equipment as follows:
1. PMMS shall accommodate contaminated effluent generated in the process ,_f crew or
equipment decontamination.
2. 'i'he PMMS shall provide the capab!qty to support routine i.'tternal cleanup of US Lab
facilities.
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3. The PMMS shall have the capability to support non-standard cleanup of leaks and _,
spills in contained volumes.
4. The standard PMMS hardware shall assist in cleanup/decontamination of non-
hazardous leaks/spills of solids and liquids into the open cabin environment, a.ae PMMS
shall not be designed for cleanup of hazardous open cabin spills. (3.7.16.2)
General Laboratory Support Facilities. The general laboratory support facilities
provide standard work areas with subsystem utility support for USL payload operations
These facilities consist of a laboratory sciences workbench, a materials processing
glovebox, and a life sciences glovebox. (3.'1.18)
IMPOSED ON USEl_
SSP 30000, SECTION 3
Several requirements imposed on the space station contain an element of User
responsibility. In some cases (2.1.11.2.2.3) a sensor interface with the Caution and
Warning system may be needed, in other cases (2.1.11.2.8) design of the experiment
: equipment will be required to incorporate the standard. Applicable requi,-ements are
2.1.11.2.1.D, 2 1 i1.2°2.3, 2.1.11.2.4.1, 2.1.112.4.5, 2.1.11.2.5,, 2.1.11.2.8, & 2.1.11.3.
These are marked with an * in the section above.
SS-IRD-0200 CUSTOMER TO USL INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS
EQUIPMENT INTEGRITY / SAFETY FACTORS (3.3.18.1) t
All customer equipment shall be designed to withstand the launch, on-orbit, and _
landing environments as defined in SS-SRD 0001, Section 3, Paragraph 2.2.1. These ; _.
environments shall be withstood without the following events., "currmg: failures; leaking
of hazardous fluids; or the releasing of equipment, loose debris, or particles which could "_
damage the USI_,or cause injury to the crew. USL customer equipment shall be designed
such that the equipment integrity and load-carrying capabiEty of structural mounting
provis!ons fulfill the following requirements: ._
a. Factors of Safety: The minimum factors of safety to be used against load limit
condition:_ to establish design loads shall be as defined in SS-SRD-0001, Section 3,
Paragraph 2.2.1.2.4. ".
b. Fatigue Life: Customer equipment shall have a fatigue life consistent with the
requirements specified in SS-SRD-0001, Section 3, Paragraph 22.1.2.7.
c. Fracture Control: Customer equipment shall be designec_ to meet _he fracture
control requirements specified in SS-SRD-0001, Section 3, Paragraph 2.2.1.2.6. .,
d. Depressurization: During normal operations, pressure within the USL shall be _.
m_,ntained at ";60 + 10 torr. Under some emergency conditions, evacuation of the module
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will be required and depressurization of the module will occur. Customer facilities shall ,
t
with._tand the environment created by the depressurization/reprcssurization without
creating an uncontrollable hazard. : :,
FIRE (3.3.18.2) , ,
a. in addition to the fire detection and .,'uppression capabilities of the ECLSS,
customer equipment which pose a potential fire hazard shall be _nstrumented by the
customer to provide for earl)" detection and warning through the Caution and Warning
Subsystem (CWS) of the USL.
b. in the event a fire is detected in the custon'Jer equipment, appropriate fire
,- suppression t;chniques will be implemented. Airflow and utilities shall be disconnected
-- by the USE
OVERTEMPERATURE (3.3.18.3)
a. Equipment which has failure modes which can produce dangerously heated
surfaces in crew areas shall provide an interface to fhe CWS to alert the crew to the
hazard and allow them to take corrective and avoidar,_e action.
b. Customer loads shall be configured such that Jn the _.ventof power disconnect or
failure, the load will cool down and/or cease operation in a safe manner.
ALERT (3.3.18.4)
The USL DMS and CWS will provide an equipment malfunction alerting system that
will be available to all customers. This system will ;lotify the USL crew members of any
abnormai or hazardous conditions and a',low them to take timely corrective action.
t
LEAKAGE (3.3.18.5)
a. Hazardous materials shall be contained within the customer equipment or the I
hazardous materials work area. All materials representing life-threatening hazards shall
be so contained that any predictable sequence of failures witl not result in celeasing them
into the USL atmosphere. Appropriate customer equipment shall be instrumented ro
detect any leakage which would present a hazard to crew or equipment. Such
instrumentation shall be connected to the USI. CWS and shall initiate both an audible
•d visual alarm at the site of the offending ,;ondition.
- ,=
b. No release ef particulate matter, liquid.s, vapors or fumes into the habitable volume
shall be permitted unless it can be shown that the ce,ntaminant can be handled by the
ECLSS. All potentially contaminating substancesassoci_,tcdwith payloads and processes
shall be identified by type, toxicity, quantity, hazard level, use, and location by the
customer. Customer contamination control is to be performed at the assembly _nd rack i
levels.
=
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SUP,FACE TEMPERATURE (3.3.18.6)
Under normal operations, the mean _radianttemperatureof the habitable interior !
•:olume shallnot exceed30*C. Exposedsu,rfaceswithinthe USL (bothUSL andcustomert
equipment) shall remain within the high and low limits of 45°C to 4"C, respectively.
Surface temperaturesexceeding45°C shall require specific interfacing agreements.No
external equipmentsurfaceswithin the USL, whether reachableor not, shall be cooler
than the dewpointtemperatureof the moduleatmosphere.
MATERIALS (3.3.18.7) i
Customer equipment materials requirements are provided in SS-SRD-0001, Section 3,
- P_agraph 2.2.1.3.
DEVELOP OPERATING PROCEDUR]_ AND CONSTRAINTS
SSP 30000, Section 4, Paragraph 2.2.H states that "all hazardous operations shall be
designed to minimize exposure of the crew to the hazardous condition." This
requirement is supported by the hazard analyses performed to identify hazards. Part of
the process is to develop controls to counter the identified hazards. At this point in the
Space Station Program, a useful project would be the development of a Space Station
Laboratory User's Ma,ual wherein user requirements could be col.3olidated and
laboratory procedures could be codified.
!
PROVIDE TRAINING AND EDUCATION
SSP 30000, Section 4, Paragraph 3.12.B requires that "crew and designated ground !
support personnel shall be certified to perform their assigned dut.es." This would i
certainly include those duties performed in the laboratory. A major resource in the
developmentof the trainingwould be a laboratoryproceduresguide suchas discussedin
the previoussection.
SSP 30000, Section4, Parag,aph 3.12.D requi;'esthat "all crewmembers shall be
trainedin spacesystemsassociatedwith.., safety, and emergencyprocedures."
CONDUCT REVIEWS AND EVALUATIONS
,:rom time to time it will be necessary to conduct reviews and evaluations to determine
if the requirements imposed on the laboratory and on the users are adequate and whether
or not they ar¢_having the"desired effect. Safety is also concer_ed w_th whether or not the
approved operating procedures are being followed. The mechanics of such a review and
evaluation would have to be developed with the view that on-site insp¢ctioc.' wc,uld be
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difficult but not necessarilyimpossible.Membershipof a reviewcommitteeis anticipated ',
to includeboth the safetyand usercommunity.This committeecouldalso be tasked_ilh
developmentand maintenanceof the proposedLaboratory User's Manual. _=
PREPLAN FOR EMERGENCIES
In spite of our best efforts to design against hazards, emergencies will arise which will
require timely response. The history of man's endeavors verifies this statement.
Preplanning is the only way to have the response capability available when necessary.
Included in a goodpreplanwill be equipment,suchas hazardoustnaterial spill response,
controland clear ) equipmentand rehearsalsin the use of the equipment.
AREAS FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT
1. TRANSACTION MANAGEMENT. A goal of the Space Station Program is to
allow the usersmaximum autonomyin manipulatingtheir experimentsfrom the ground..
: Safety has concernsregardingconflicts betweenoperationsrequestedfrom the ground
awd conditionson-orbit which could result in hazards to the crew. This problem is
currentlybeing workedat Level lI and satisfa(.toryresolutionis anticipated.
2. OPEN CABIN HAZARDOUS MATERIAL SPILLS. Current no system or
subsystemhas been identified to handle open cabin spills of hazaroous materials.
Candidatesystemsare PMMS, Man Sys:ems,and ECLSS. Work needsto be donefirst in
the characterizationof the problem in terms of required responsesto a number of
different types of materials.
3. SPACE STATION LABORATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL. This type of *
manual is necessaryfor the consolidationof requirementsimposedupon the userandthe
codification of procedures (including emergency procedures). This document would also !
be usedin review and evaluationof the laboratoryand its opera( ,n.
_'; 22- 8 ":
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ENVIRONEMTALCONTAMINANTSIN RECYLCEDWATER
A. DEHUMIDIFIER IS PROBABLYA MAJORAIR
DECONTAMIHATIONSYSTEM
1. TYPE CONTAMINANTSREMOVED:
VAPORS- MOST EFFECTIVE FOR WATER
SOLUBLE, LOWVAPOR PRESSURECOMPOUNDS
SOME LOWSOLUBILITY COMPOUNDS EEN
IN CONDENSATES
PARTICULATES - MAY COMEDOWNWITH WATER
CONDENSATES
2. RESULTS OF SPACELABWATERCONDENSATE
ANALYSES
COMPOUND CONCENTRATION(MG/L)
SL-1 SL-3 SL D-1
CAPROLACTAM 0.07 4.30 8.80
DECANOIC ACID 1.60 0.07
ETHANOL 0.52 1._0 0.15
ISOPROPANOL 13.0 0.32 0.04
TOLUENE 0.24 0,01
PHENOL 0.24 0.66
ACETONE 3.31 2.00 1.80
NORMALWATER LOSS INTO AIR: 1.6 L/PERSON/DAY
B. MEANSOF CONTAMINANTREMOVALFROMWATER:
.. ACTIVATED CARBON, ION EXCHANGERESINS
PROBABLYHARDERTO SCRUBCONTAMINANTS
FROMWATERTHAN FROMAIR
C. TOXICITY CONCERNS:
INGESTION
ADSORPIONTHROUGHSKIN
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